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apparently hoped to find the answer in KRS sec. 58.010, which author-
izes "public projects" defined in broad terms of public health and
welfare and provides for the pledging of any funds or tax revenues not
required by law to be devoted to some other purpose.10 There is
language in the Faulconer case" which indicates that the court might
hold the industrial building purchase situation a "public project" as
defined by KRS sec. 58.010. Indeed, the court itself only six years
later said: "And in Faulconer v. City of Danville . . . we held that
the acquisition and ownership by a city of an 'industrial building'
was a 'public project' within the purview of KRS Chap. 58, authoriz-
ing the issuance of revenue bonds."12 Unfortunately for the city
fathers of Henderson, the court in the principal case refused to adhere
to its previous statements and found such ventures are not authorized
by KRS sec. 50.010.
In conclusion, it may be well to speculate upon the practical
effects of the decision reached in the principal case. As the law of
Kentucky now stands, a city may finance such projects either (1) by
general obligation bonds secured by the taxing power under KRS
secs. 66.050-070, or (2) by revenue bonds payable solely from the
project income as authorized by KRS see. 103.280. Thus, cities op-
pressed with unemployment and faced with the offer of industrial
salvation can purchase industrial property to lease only if they can
surmount the two-thirds vote barrier of KRS sec. 66.070, or can per-
suade the municipal bond buyers that the industry is certain to stay
and make rental payments on the lease. Considering the current
bond market and the availability of municipal bonds secured by the
taxing power, the above procedures hardly seem practical. It would
appear one primary qualification of the city councilmen of the future
will be the power of salesmanship-either to the voters, or to the
municipal bond purchaser.
G. W. Shadoan
TIAL PROCEDUE-INsTRUcnONs To JuRY-NoNTAxABrrY OF PER-
SONAL INJuRY AwARD.-Plaintiff brought an action to recover damages
for personal injuries caused by the alleged negligence of the defendant
railroad. The defendant requested that the jury be instructed that
any award given plaintiff would not be subject to income taxes, state
or federal. From the refusal of the court to give the instruction, the
defendant appealed. Held: Affirmed. Louisville & Nashville Railroad
' 0 KRS § 58.130.
11 Faulconer v. City of Danvile, 313 Ky. 468,471, 232 S.W.2d 80,82 (1950).
12 Dyche v. City of London, 288 S.W.2d 648,651 (Ky. 1956).
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Co. v. Mattingly, 318 S.W. 2d (Ky. 1958) (judgment for plaintiff re-
versed on other grounds).
This was a case of first impression in Kentucky. The court did not
disclose the reasoning upon which it based its decision but simply
said that it was of the opinion Kentucky should follow "the majority
rule which brands such an instruction as misleading in its effects on
the minds of the jury."' In examining the problem raised in this
decision, it may be worthwhile to consider the reasoning applied by
other courts in reaching the same result.
There are four points during the course of a trial where the fact
that the awards for personal injuries are not taxable 2 could be injected.
They are: (1) in the instructions,3 (2) in closing argument,4 (3)
during the introduction of evidence, 5 and (4) in determination of the
proper amount of damages to be awarded.6 Only the Missouri court
has indicated that it would allow the non-taxability of the award to be
presented to the jury, solely by means of a cautionary instruction.7 But
even that court held that it was not error to exclude evidence of this
fact or to prohibit it from being brought out in closing argument.
Ohio is the only jurisdiction, other than Kentucky and Missouri,
which has considered the propriety of such an instruction." The court
of that state pointed out that if such an instruction were given it would
1 318 S.W.2d at 848.
2 The Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 104 (a) (2) provides that gross income
does not include "the amount of any damages received (whether by suit or
agreement) on account of personal injuries or sickness." This exclusion would
appear to be incorporated into Ky. Rev. Stat. § 141.010 (9) (1959) which de-
fines "net income" by incorporating the definition of "taxable income" contained
in the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 68 (a) which in turn must obviously
not include those items specifically excluded by § 104 (a) (2).
3 Margevich v. Chicago & No. W. Ry., 1 Ii. App. 2d 162,116 N.E.2d 914
(1953); Dempsey v. Thompson, 363 Mo. 389, 251 S.W.2d 42 (1952); Maus v.
New York, C. & St. L. R.R., 128 N.E.2d 166 (Ohio App. 1955); Texas & N. 0.
R.R. v. Pool, 263 S.W.2d 582 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958) (dictum).
4Hall v. Chicago & No. W. Ry., 5 Ill.2d 185, 125 N.E.2d 77 (1955); Pfister
v. City of Cleveland, 96 Ohio App. 185, 118 N.E.2d 366 (1953).
5 Chicago & No. W. Ry. v. Curl, 178 F.2d 497 (8th Cir. 1949); Texas &
N. 0. R.R. v. Pool, 263 S.W.2d 582 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953).6 Southen Pac. Co. v. Guthrie, 186 F.2d 926 (9th Cir. 1951). cert. denied,
341 U.S. 904 (1951); Stokes v. United States, 144 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1944) (trial
by court without a jury); O'Donnell v. Great No. Ry., 109 F. Supp. 590 (N.D.
Cal. 1951); Smith v. Pennsylvania R.R., 47 Ohio Op. 49, 59 Ohio L. Abs. 282,
99 N.E.2d 501 (Ct. App. 1950); Billingham v. Hughes. [1949] 1 K.B. 648
(trial by court without a jury).
7Dempsey v. Thompson, 863 Mo. 839, 251 S.W.2d 42 (1952). But see
also Texas & N. 0. R.R. v. Pool, 263 S.W.2d 582,592 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953) in
which the court, though sustaining exclusion of evidence of deductions for in-
come tax, stated it was in accord with Dempsey v. Thompson, supra, as to jury
instructions.
8 Maus v. New York C. & St. L. R.R., 128 N.E.2d 166 (Ohio Ct. App. 1955);
Cf. Margevich v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., 1 IM. App. 2d 162, 116 N.E.2d 914
(1953). which held the tendered instruction on tax exemption bad, distinguish-
ing it from the one in Dempsey v. Thompson.
1960]
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require segregation of the award for loss of earnings from awards for
pain, suffering, and mental anguish, since only the former would be
compensation for income which would have been taxable if received
in the normal manner. The court went on to say:
The result of several such inquiries would so complicate the trial of
a personal injury action into an intricate discussion of tax and non-
tax liabilities, and so confuse the ordinary jury with technical tax
questions as to defeat the purpose of a trial.9
The court also reasoned that, although it was a correct statement of the
law, the requested instruction was not pertinent to any issue in the
case.
In Hall v. Chicago & Northwestern Railroad Co.,10 the Illinois court
upheld the granting of a new trial where counsel for the defendant told
the jury during the closing argument that the verdict would be tax
exempt. The court gave as its reasons for so holding the following:
(1) Such an argument infers that the jury will not follow the instruc-
tions as to what factors may properly be considered in fixing damages
but that they will add to the amount justified by the evidence an ad-
ditional amount to offset a supposed tax liability of the plaintiff. Such
misconduct by the jury should not be assumed. (2) If the defendant
may point out the nontaxability of the verdict, there is no reason why
the plaintiff should not be permitted to point out that damages do not
include an award to cover the costs of trial, medical witnesses, taling
depositions, court reporting, and attorneys' fees; that defendant may
deduct any award from excess profits taxes and include it as an expense
in fixing railroad fares; and so on ad infinitum. (3) Where the defen-
dant gets the money to pay the award and what plaintiff does with it is
no concern of the court or jury. (4) Any matter of taxes concerns only
the plaintiff and the tax commissioner. (5) Mitigation of damages by
the jury on account of taxes would defeat the purpose of Congress in
giving this tax advantage to plaintiffs.
Other courts have held that any attempt to fix an amount by which
the judgment should be reduced to account for taxes would necessarily
have to be based upon pure conjecture and speculation as to many
factors." Such factors include, inter alia: the number of exemptions
plaintiff has; the extent to which such exemptions will be increased or
9 Maus v. New York, C. & St. L. R.R., 128 N.E.2d 166, 167 (Ohio Ct. App.
1955).
105 Ill.2d 135, 125 N. E.2d 77 (1955).
11 Southern Pac. Co. v. Guthrie, 186 F.2d 926 (9th Cir. 1951), cert.
denied, 341 U.S. 904 (1951); Stokes v. United States, 144 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1944);
O'Donnell v. Great No. Ry., 109 F. Supp. 590 (N.D. Cal. 1951); Pfister v. City
of Cleveland, 96 Ohio App. 185, 113 N.E.2d 366 (1953); Smith v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 47 Ohio Op. 49, 59 Ohio L. Abs. 282, 99 N.E.2d 501 (Ct. App. 1950);
Texas & N. 0. R.R. v. Pool, 263 S.W.2d 582 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953).
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diminished by him or a dependant of his going blind, reaching 65 years
of age, dying, etc.; what tax bracket he is in or may later be put into by
outside earnings; changes in the tax rates; the amount of deductions
plaintiff may be entitled to; and many other variables.
The Missouri court in Dempsey 'v. Thompson1 2 indicated that a
cautionary instruction would prevent the jury from being misled by
their natural assumption that the amount awarded for lost earnings
would be subject to income taxes. The court there disclaimed any be-
lief that the jury would not follow the general instructions on com-
putation of damages. The weight of logic and reasoning, however,
strongly supports the result reached by the Kentucky court in the
principle case. Having reached this result, the court is also likely to
deny admission of evidence of the nontaxability of the verdict and pro-
hibit this fact from being brought out in closing argument or con-
sidered in computing damages. Logical consistancy and the persuas-
ive case authority from other jurisdictions would seem to dictate such
a conclusion.
James H. Byrdwell
12 68 Mo. 836, 251 S.W.2d 42 (1952).
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